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Ðñüóöáôåò Êáôá÷ùñÞóåéò |Áñ÷åßï

Áñ÷åßï: 2015

19 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
The Greek Time Bomb
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

19 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
H ÅëëçíéêÞ ÙñïëïãéáêÞ Âüìâá
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

11 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
ÅêëïãÝò: Êßíäõíïé êáé åðéëïãÝò
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2014

8 Éïõíßïõ 2014
The Periphery¢s Purgatory

3 Éïõíßïõ 2014
ON THE STATE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Áñ÷åßï: 2013

6 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2013
The Re-Division of Europe
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

21 Áõãïýóôïõ 2013
The Eurozone¢s Misplaced Orthodoxies

12 Éïõíßïõ 2013
Bismarck versus Bismarck

29 Ìáúïõ 2013
The German Question Revisited

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2013
I Brought the Euro to Greece

4 Áðñéëßïõ 2013
Europe¢s Perpetual Crisis

6 Ìáñôßïõ 2013
A Global “New Deal”?

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2013
Greece and the Euro

21 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2013
Globalization¢s European Test

Áñ÷åßï: 2012

1 Éïõíßïõ 2012
Greece¢s Catharsis?

9 Ìáúïõ 2012
Steering Clear of the Euro Precipice

3 Ìáúïõ 2012
Ç ÅëëÜäá óôç ÌÜ÷ç ôçò Åõñþðçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2011

16 Íïåìâñßïõ 2011
Ôåëåõôáßá Åõêáéñßá;
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

9 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2011
ÁíÜêôçóç ôçò ÷áìÝíçò åìðéóôïóýíçò ãéá íá ìåßíïõìå óôï åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2011
Ãéá íá Ìåßíïõìå óôï Åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2011
Decision time for the eurozone - Project Syndicate

24 Áðñéëßïõ 2011
Ç EëëÜäá óå êñßóç: õðÜñ÷åé äéÝîïäïò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

19 Áðñéëßïõ 2011
Ç EëëÜäá óå Êñßóç: ÕðÜñ÷åé ÄéÝîïäïò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

3 Ìáñôßïõ 2011
AÃÉÏÃÑÁÖÉÅÓ ÓêÜëåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

10 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2011
Policy prescriptions for curing -eurozonitis-

7 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2011
×ÑÇÌÁÔÉÓÔÇÑÉO 1999-2000

17 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2011
Ç Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç óå Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2010

26 Éïõíßïõ 2010
Ïé äéáñèñùôéêÝò áëëáãÝò èá ôïíþóïõí ôçí ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

20 Éïõíßïõ 2010
ÊËÅÉÄÉ ÃÉÁ ÅÎÏÄÏ ÁÐÏ ÔÇÍ ÊÑÉÓÇ ÏÉ ÌÅÔÁÑÑÕÈÌÉÓÅÉÓ
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

26 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
Êñßóç êáé ÁíÜêáìøç
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

4 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
ÁÑÈÑÏ ÓÔÇÍ ÇËÅÊÔÑÏÍÉÊÇ ÅÖÇÌÅÑÉÄÁ NEWSIT

3 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
ÄÞëùóç óôçí åöçìåñßäá Ôï Âçìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

18 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
Êñßóéìåò ¿ñåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

18 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
Ïéêïíïìßá:Êñßóéìåò ÅðéëïãÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «ÅÐÉÊÁÉÑÁ»

10 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
ÅëëçíéêÞ Ïéêïíïìßá:¸îïäïò áðü ôçí êñßóç
Ðåñéïäéêü «FORUM»

9 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2010
ÙÑÁ ÁÍÁÄÉÐËÙÓÇÓ ÓÔÇÍ ÏÉÊÏÍÏÌÉÊÇ ÐÏËÉÔÉÊÇ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

Áñ÷åßï: 2009

12 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
Ìåßùóç ôïõ åëëåßììáôïò ôï 2010 óôï 8% ôïõ ÁÅÐ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ï Êüóìïò ôïõ ÅðåíäõôÞ»

9 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
ÅëëÜäá êáé Êñßóç: ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Ïðéóèïäñüìçóç;
Åöçìåñßäá «Áîßá»

1 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
Ïéêïíïìßá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «Äçìüóéïò ÔïìÝáò»

26 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Óôáóéìüôçôá;
Ðåñéïäéêü «The Economist»

15 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
Êéíäõíïé êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
ÌåôÜ ôéò ÂñõîÝëëåò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

26 Éïõëßïõ 2009
ÓôñáâÜ Áñìåíßæïõìå
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Éïõëßïõ 2009
«ÅëëÜäá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÞ»
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

21 Éïõíßïõ 2009
¿ñá ÁðïöÜóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Áðñéëßïõ 2009
Ðáãêüóìéá Êñßóç êáé ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

7 Áðñéëßïõ 2009
«ÍÝá ÔÜîç» êáé ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Ìáñôßïõ 2009
¸ëëåéììá Óõíáßíåóçò, Þ Çãåóßáò ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åêóõã÷ñïíéóìü
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Êéíäõíåýåé ôï Åõñþ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

14 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Êñßóç êáé êçäåìïíßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

24 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2009
ÔÝóóåñá ðñïáðáéôïýìåíá ãéá åðéóôñïöÞ óôçí áíÜðôõîç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

18 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2009
Ôï êáëü ôïõ ôüðïõ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2008

17 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2008
ÊïéíùíéêÞ ÅîÝãåñóç êáé Ïéêïíïìéêïß Êßíäõíïé
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
Ãéá ôçí ¸îïäï áðü ôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

20 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
Óþñåõóç Êéíäýíùí
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

5 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
ÏìðÜìá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
Ç ¿ñá ôçò ÊåíôñïáñéóôåñÜò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

16 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

10 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
ÊñÜôïò êáé Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

6 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
Êñßóç êáé ÅêëïãÝò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

24 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

17 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Ïéêïíïìßá êáé Áîéïðéóôßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

10 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Ðñüêëçóç Íßêçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

3 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Êñßóç ÐïëéôéêÞò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

27 Áõãïýóôïõ 2008
ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

26 Áõãïýóôïõ 2008
3ç ÓåðôÝìâñç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Éïõëßïõ 2008
Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÄéÝîïäïò óôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

16 Éïõëßïõ 2008
Ç Åõñþðç óå Õðï÷þñçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

9 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÏõÜóéãêôïí, Éïýëéïò 08
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

24 Éïõíßïõ 2008
ÐïëéôéêÞ ÁëëáãÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

18 Éïõíßïõ 2008
H ÐïëéôéêÞ óå Äïêéìáóßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

11 Éïõíßïõ 2008
Ðñüåäñïò ÏìðÜìá;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

21 Ìáúïõ 2008
×ùñßò Áöïñéóìïýò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

5 Ìáúïõ 2008
Áêñßâåéá êáé Åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

15 Áðñéëßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç , Åõñþ êáé ï ñüëïò ôïõ ÊñÜôïõò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

27 Ìáñôßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ç ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2007

10 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2007
Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2007
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

20 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ãéá Ìéá ÐñáãìáôéêÞ Ìåôáññýèìéóç - ÊñÜôïò êáé Ðïëßôçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Óôçí Ðñþôç ÃñáììÞ ôçò ÁíÜðôõîçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

11 Éïõíßïõ 2007
ÐåñéâÜëëïí êáé ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

9 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

7 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç, ïéêïíïìßá ôçò áãïñÜò êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

6 Éïõíßïõ 2007
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé ÅêëïãÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «ÁÍÔÉ»

18 Ìáúïõ 2007
Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá ôùí Åêëïãþí

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2007
ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôç Ãáëëßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

3 Áðñéëßïõ 2007
Ôï ÔÝëïò ôçò ÁìåñéêáíéêÞò Ìïíïêñáôïñßáò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

28 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2007
ÁñéóôåñÜ êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2007
Ãéá ¸íá ÍÝï Êýêëï Ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

Áñ÷åßï: 2006

29 Íïåìâñßïõ 2006
ÁëëáãÞ óôçí Ðáéäåßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

24 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2006
ÌåôÜ ôéò åêëïãÝò, ôé;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

18 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2006
Ïéêïíïìßá : Ç ÍÝá Ðñüêëçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

4 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2006
Êáôåõèýíóåéò ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç ôçò ÅëëçíéêÞò Ïéêïíïìßáò
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

10 Áõãïýóôïõ 2006
Ó÷üëéï Ñé÷Üñäïõ Óùìåñßôç óôç Íôüúôóå ÂÝëëå: Ç ðåñßðôùóç Ðáðáíôùíßïõ

5 Éïõëßïõ 2006
Ãéá ìéá ÓôñáôçãéêÞ ôçò ÁñéóôåñÜò óôçí Åõñþðç
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

3 Éïõëßïõ 2006
Ðüñïé ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç êáé ôçí ÊïéíùíéêÞ Óõíï÷Þ
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

15 Ìáúïõ 2006
ãéá ôïí ÁíäñÝá ÐáðáíäñÝïõ

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2006
To: Ôhe Editor of the Financial Times

16 Áðñéëßïõ 2006
Ï êüóìïò ôñÝ÷åé. Ç ÅëëÜäá ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

10 Ìáñôßïõ 2006
Ôï åðüìåíï âÞìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

9 Ìáñôßïõ 2006
Ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ áíáêÜìðôåé êáé óôçí ðñüèåóç øÞöïõ Ý÷åé ìçäåíßóåé ôç äéáöïñÜ ìå ôç ÍÄ ...
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

17 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2006
Ç ÁëÞèåéá ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

Áñ÷åßï: 2005

20 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Áðáó÷üëçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

17 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åõñùðáúêü Îåêßíçìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

1 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ðïõ ÐÜåé ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ;
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò»

1 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá, ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

16 Éïõíßïõ 2005
Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

9 Éïõíßïõ 2005
ÄéáñèñùôéêÝò ÁëëáãÝò : Í.Ä. êáé ÐÁÓÏÊ

1 Éïõíßïõ 2005
Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

22 Ìáúïõ 2005
Êé üìùò ÷ñåéáæüìáóôå Ýíá íÝï êýìá åêóõã÷ñïíéóìïý
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ç ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç êáé ï Ñüëïò ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ¸íùóçò óôçí Ðáãêüóìéá ÄéáêõâÝñíçóç

17 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ìåôáîý Åõñþðçò êáé ÁìåñéêÞò: Ç ÄåîéÜ ÅðéëïãÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

2 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ç ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅêôñïðÞ ôçò Í.Ä.
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

26 Ìáñôßïõ 2005
EõñùðáúêÞ Åíïðïßçóç êáé ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

13 Ìáñôßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá : ¸íáò ÷ñüíïò ÍÝáò Äçìïêñáôßáò

24 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2005
ÐñïÝ÷åé ôï èÝìá ôçò ïéêïíïìßáò ...
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

25 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
ÐÁÓÏÊ: Ïé ðñïêëÞóåéò ôçò ÍÝáò Åðï÷Þò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

12 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí åñþôçóç ôçò ÇÌÅÑÇÓÉÁÓ

1 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá : ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò
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1 Éïõíßïõ 2012,
Greece¢s Catharsis?

ATHENS – Sunday¢s election in Greece will decide whether confrontation or negotiation will be used to change the terms of Greece¢s refinancing agreement with the eurozone. Rather than helping Greece to overcome its crisis, the austerity policies pursued since May 2010 have plunged it into a deep recession that perpetuates fiscal deficits and aggravates financial uncertainty.
It is becoming increasingly clear that if Greece proceeds to unilateral action – whether by repealing unpopular austerity laws or renouncing the loan agreement itself – the eurozone will suspend disbursement of the loan. The government will find it impossible to fulfill basic obligations, such as paying salaries and pensions, and the country will formally default. International banks will cease to finance Greek enterprises, including imports, creating shortages of fuel, food, and medicines. As confidence that Greece will remain in the eurozone plummets, a run on deposits will cause the banking system – and, eventually, the real economy – to collapse.
The next step will be forced exit from the euro and reintroduction of the drachma, implying a dramatic drop in living standards, owing in part to immediate devaluation of the new currency and high inflation. Meanwhile, the benefits in terms of competitiveness will be very limited, owing to the country¢s narrow export base, and will be evaporated in a vicious circle of devaluations and rising interest rates.
Long-term stagnation and high unemployment are the likely result of confrontation with the eurozone, which leaves only the path of renegotiation. The new political balance emerging in Europe after the Socialists¢ victory in France¢s presidential election creates scope for changes in the terms of the loan agreement that would help to boost economic growth.
Opting for renegotiation assumes the victory of pro-euro political forces in Sunday¢s elections. New Democracy, Pasok, and Democratic Left belong to this group, as opposed to Syriza and some smaller parties on the extreme right and left, which support a confrontational stance vis-à-vis the eurozone, eventually leading to the euro exit. If a pro-euro majority emerges on June 17, the new government¢s main challenge will be to propose a new policy agenda, and then to negotiate a revised deal with the eurozone.
The key to growth is increased competitiveness through higher productivity and lower production costs. In the 1990¢s, in the run-up to joining the eurozone, Greece achieved substantial gains on this front. With inflation falling sharply, real incomes increased. Fiscal deficits were reduced. Important structural reforms were implemented, particularly privatization. Investment accelerated, and major infrastructure projects were realized. High growth rates were achieved in conditions of stability.
Unfortunately, that effort ceased over the last decade. Selfish interests prevailed. Business groups attempted to capture specific markets. Public-sector trade unions

fought for preserving privileges. Tax discipline was further weakened. The welfare state was transformed into a system of endemic waste. A gap emerged between the economy¢s productive base, which remained stagnant, and Greeks¢ expectations (and demands), which were rising fast.
The agreement with the eurozone attempted to close the gap in a clumsy and misguided way. Instead of focusing on structural reforms to liberate the economy¢s productive forces, it relied on income cuts in and tax increases. The incompetence of the governments that implemented the agreement exacerbates that defect by sidelining structural reforms and enacting only the terms concerning austerity.
The renegotiation should aim at changing the policy mix in the following directions:
 Extending the timetable of fiscal-deficit reduction in order to limit the depth of the recession.
 Avoiding any new cut in incomes or new taxes, with reduction in indirect taxation to start immediately.
 Social-protection measures, particularly for the unemployed.
 A European Marshall Plan, through grants from the European Union¢s structural funds and loans from the European Investment Bank, in order to sustain economic activity and create new jobs.
Achieving these targets presupposes that Greece¢s new government implements all of the structural changes agreed with the eurozone. Privatization, opening up closed markets and professions, promoting entrepreneurship, and eliminating public-sector waste should proceed at a fast pace over the next few months.
The European Marshall Plan would offer a unique opportunity to reorient growth policies. Greece should move beyond its traditional focus on sectors such as tourism, shipping, and construction, and search for new areas of comparative advantage in renewable energy, high-value-added services, and selected lines of manufacturing that benefit from the country¢s research potential.
If Greece succeeds in fulfilling the requirements of a revised financing agreement with the eurozone, it may win the confidence bet by convincing financial markets that it is determined to achieve the targets.
Confidence will unlock the door to economic recovery. The fear of a return to the drachma will recede. Consumption levels will begin to recover. Deposit outflows will cease. The banking system will be reinforced. Investors will reevaluate opportunities for undertaking new initiatives. A virtuous circle may be set in motion, leading the country, eventually, to escape the crisis zone.
The outcome of Sunday¢s election will determine which way Greece goes – and, also, of course, how the unfolding Greek drama affects the eurozone¢s future.

Yannos Papantoniou was Greece¢s Economy and Finance Minister from 1994 to 2001. He is currently President of the Center for Progressive Policy Research, an independent think-tank.

article published on: Project Syndicate (June 2012)

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