ÃéÜííïò Ðáðáíôùíßïõ
   search

Ãñáöåßï Ôýðïõ

Ðñüóöáôåò Êáôá÷ùñÞóåéò |Áñ÷åßï

Áñ÷åßï: 2015

19 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
The Greek Time Bomb
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

19 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
H ÅëëçíéêÞ ÙñïëïãéáêÞ Âüìâá
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

11 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
ÅêëïãÝò: Êßíäõíïé êáé åðéëïãÝò
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2014

8 Éïõíßïõ 2014
The Periphery¢s Purgatory

3 Éïõíßïõ 2014
ON THE STATE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Áñ÷åßï: 2013

6 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2013
The Re-Division of Europe
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

21 Áõãïýóôïõ 2013
The Eurozone¢s Misplaced Orthodoxies

12 Éïõíßïõ 2013
Bismarck versus Bismarck

29 Ìáúïõ 2013
The German Question Revisited

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2013
I Brought the Euro to Greece

4 Áðñéëßïõ 2013
Europe¢s Perpetual Crisis

6 Ìáñôßïõ 2013
A Global “New Deal”?

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2013
Greece and the Euro

21 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2013
Globalization¢s European Test

Áñ÷åßï: 2012

1 Éïõíßïõ 2012
Greece¢s Catharsis?

9 Ìáúïõ 2012
Steering Clear of the Euro Precipice

3 Ìáúïõ 2012
Ç ÅëëÜäá óôç ÌÜ÷ç ôçò Åõñþðçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2011

16 Íïåìâñßïõ 2011
Ôåëåõôáßá Åõêáéñßá;
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

9 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2011
ÁíÜêôçóç ôçò ÷áìÝíçò åìðéóôïóýíçò ãéá íá ìåßíïõìå óôï åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2011
Ãéá íá Ìåßíïõìå óôï Åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2011
Decision time for the eurozone - Project Syndicate

24 Áðñéëßïõ 2011
Ç EëëÜäá óå êñßóç: õðÜñ÷åé äéÝîïäïò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

19 Áðñéëßïõ 2011
Ç EëëÜäá óå Êñßóç: ÕðÜñ÷åé ÄéÝîïäïò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

3 Ìáñôßïõ 2011
AÃÉÏÃÑÁÖÉÅÓ ÓêÜëåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

10 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2011
Policy prescriptions for curing -eurozonitis-

7 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2011
×ÑÇÌÁÔÉÓÔÇÑÉO 1999-2000

17 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2011
Ç Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç óå Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2010

26 Éïõíßïõ 2010
Ïé äéáñèñùôéêÝò áëëáãÝò èá ôïíþóïõí ôçí ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

20 Éïõíßïõ 2010
ÊËÅÉÄÉ ÃÉÁ ÅÎÏÄÏ ÁÐÏ ÔÇÍ ÊÑÉÓÇ ÏÉ ÌÅÔÁÑÑÕÈÌÉÓÅÉÓ
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

26 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
Êñßóç êáé ÁíÜêáìøç
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

4 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
ÁÑÈÑÏ ÓÔÇÍ ÇËÅÊÔÑÏÍÉÊÇ ÅÖÇÌÅÑÉÄÁ NEWSIT

3 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
ÄÞëùóç óôçí åöçìåñßäá Ôï Âçìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

18 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
Êñßóéìåò ¿ñåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

18 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
Ïéêïíïìßá:Êñßóéìåò ÅðéëïãÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «ÅÐÉÊÁÉÑÁ»

10 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
ÅëëçíéêÞ Ïéêïíïìßá:¸îïäïò áðü ôçí êñßóç
Ðåñéïäéêü «FORUM»

9 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2010
ÙÑÁ ÁÍÁÄÉÐËÙÓÇÓ ÓÔÇÍ ÏÉÊÏÍÏÌÉÊÇ ÐÏËÉÔÉÊÇ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

Áñ÷åßï: 2009

12 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
Ìåßùóç ôïõ åëëåßììáôïò ôï 2010 óôï 8% ôïõ ÁÅÐ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ï Êüóìïò ôïõ ÅðåíäõôÞ»

9 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
ÅëëÜäá êáé Êñßóç: ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Ïðéóèïäñüìçóç;
Åöçìåñßäá «Áîßá»

1 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
Ïéêïíïìßá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «Äçìüóéïò ÔïìÝáò»

26 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Óôáóéìüôçôá;
Ðåñéïäéêü «The Economist»

15 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
Êéíäõíïé êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
ÌåôÜ ôéò ÂñõîÝëëåò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

26 Éïõëßïõ 2009
ÓôñáâÜ Áñìåíßæïõìå
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Éïõëßïõ 2009
«ÅëëÜäá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÞ»
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

21 Éïõíßïõ 2009
¿ñá ÁðïöÜóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Áðñéëßïõ 2009
Ðáãêüóìéá Êñßóç êáé ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

7 Áðñéëßïõ 2009
«ÍÝá ÔÜîç» êáé ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Ìáñôßïõ 2009
¸ëëåéììá Óõíáßíåóçò, Þ Çãåóßáò ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åêóõã÷ñïíéóìü
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Êéíäõíåýåé ôï Åõñþ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

14 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Êñßóç êáé êçäåìïíßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

24 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2009
ÔÝóóåñá ðñïáðáéôïýìåíá ãéá åðéóôñïöÞ óôçí áíÜðôõîç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

18 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2009
Ôï êáëü ôïõ ôüðïõ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2008

17 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2008
ÊïéíùíéêÞ ÅîÝãåñóç êáé Ïéêïíïìéêïß Êßíäõíïé
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
Ãéá ôçí ¸îïäï áðü ôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

20 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
Óþñåõóç Êéíäýíùí
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

5 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
ÏìðÜìá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
Ç ¿ñá ôçò ÊåíôñïáñéóôåñÜò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

16 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

10 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
ÊñÜôïò êáé Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

6 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
Êñßóç êáé ÅêëïãÝò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

24 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

17 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Ïéêïíïìßá êáé Áîéïðéóôßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

10 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Ðñüêëçóç Íßêçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

3 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Êñßóç ÐïëéôéêÞò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

27 Áõãïýóôïõ 2008
ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

26 Áõãïýóôïõ 2008
3ç ÓåðôÝìâñç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Éïõëßïõ 2008
Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÄéÝîïäïò óôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

16 Éïõëßïõ 2008
Ç Åõñþðç óå Õðï÷þñçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

9 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÏõÜóéãêôïí, Éïýëéïò 08
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

24 Éïõíßïõ 2008
ÐïëéôéêÞ ÁëëáãÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

18 Éïõíßïõ 2008
H ÐïëéôéêÞ óå Äïêéìáóßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

11 Éïõíßïõ 2008
Ðñüåäñïò ÏìðÜìá;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

21 Ìáúïõ 2008
×ùñßò Áöïñéóìïýò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

5 Ìáúïõ 2008
Áêñßâåéá êáé Åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

15 Áðñéëßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç , Åõñþ êáé ï ñüëïò ôïõ ÊñÜôïõò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

27 Ìáñôßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ç ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2007

10 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2007
Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2007
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

20 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ãéá Ìéá ÐñáãìáôéêÞ Ìåôáññýèìéóç - ÊñÜôïò êáé Ðïëßôçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Óôçí Ðñþôç ÃñáììÞ ôçò ÁíÜðôõîçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

11 Éïõíßïõ 2007
ÐåñéâÜëëïí êáé ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

9 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

7 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç, ïéêïíïìßá ôçò áãïñÜò êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

6 Éïõíßïõ 2007
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé ÅêëïãÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «ÁÍÔÉ»

18 Ìáúïõ 2007
Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá ôùí Åêëïãþí

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2007
ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôç Ãáëëßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

3 Áðñéëßïõ 2007
Ôï ÔÝëïò ôçò ÁìåñéêáíéêÞò Ìïíïêñáôïñßáò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

28 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2007
ÁñéóôåñÜ êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2007
Ãéá ¸íá ÍÝï Êýêëï Ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

Áñ÷åßï: 2006

29 Íïåìâñßïõ 2006
ÁëëáãÞ óôçí Ðáéäåßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

24 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2006
ÌåôÜ ôéò åêëïãÝò, ôé;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

18 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2006
Ïéêïíïìßá : Ç ÍÝá Ðñüêëçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

4 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2006
Êáôåõèýíóåéò ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç ôçò ÅëëçíéêÞò Ïéêïíïìßáò
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

10 Áõãïýóôïõ 2006
Ó÷üëéï Ñé÷Üñäïõ Óùìåñßôç óôç Íôüúôóå ÂÝëëå: Ç ðåñßðôùóç Ðáðáíôùíßïõ

5 Éïõëßïõ 2006
Ãéá ìéá ÓôñáôçãéêÞ ôçò ÁñéóôåñÜò óôçí Åõñþðç
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

3 Éïõëßïõ 2006
Ðüñïé ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç êáé ôçí ÊïéíùíéêÞ Óõíï÷Þ
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

15 Ìáúïõ 2006
ãéá ôïí ÁíäñÝá ÐáðáíäñÝïõ

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2006
To: Ôhe Editor of the Financial Times

16 Áðñéëßïõ 2006
Ï êüóìïò ôñÝ÷åé. Ç ÅëëÜäá ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

10 Ìáñôßïõ 2006
Ôï åðüìåíï âÞìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

9 Ìáñôßïõ 2006
Ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ áíáêÜìðôåé êáé óôçí ðñüèåóç øÞöïõ Ý÷åé ìçäåíßóåé ôç äéáöïñÜ ìå ôç ÍÄ ...
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

17 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2006
Ç ÁëÞèåéá ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

Áñ÷åßï: 2005

20 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Áðáó÷üëçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

17 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åõñùðáúêü Îåêßíçìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

1 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ðïõ ÐÜåé ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ;
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò»

1 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá, ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

16 Éïõíßïõ 2005
Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

9 Éïõíßïõ 2005
ÄéáñèñùôéêÝò ÁëëáãÝò : Í.Ä. êáé ÐÁÓÏÊ

1 Éïõíßïõ 2005
Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

22 Ìáúïõ 2005
Êé üìùò ÷ñåéáæüìáóôå Ýíá íÝï êýìá åêóõã÷ñïíéóìïý
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ç ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç êáé ï Ñüëïò ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ¸íùóçò óôçí Ðáãêüóìéá ÄéáêõâÝñíçóç

17 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ìåôáîý Åõñþðçò êáé ÁìåñéêÞò: Ç ÄåîéÜ ÅðéëïãÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

2 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ç ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅêôñïðÞ ôçò Í.Ä.
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

26 Ìáñôßïõ 2005
EõñùðáúêÞ Åíïðïßçóç êáé ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

13 Ìáñôßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá : ¸íáò ÷ñüíïò ÍÝáò Äçìïêñáôßáò

24 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2005
ÐñïÝ÷åé ôï èÝìá ôçò ïéêïíïìßáò ...
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

25 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
ÐÁÓÏÊ: Ïé ðñïêëÞóåéò ôçò ÍÝáò Åðï÷Þò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

12 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí åñþôçóç ôçò ÇÌÅÑÇÓÉÁÓ

1 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá : ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

Áñ÷åßï: 2004

19 Íïåìâñßïõ 2004
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé Óõíáóðéóìüò
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò»

10 Íïåìâñßïõ 2004
ÅîùôåñéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ ÷ùñßò Ðõîßäá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

9 Íïåìâñßïõ 2004
Óêüðéá êáé ÅëëçíéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ óôá ÂáëêÜíéá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

5 Íïåìâñßïõ 2004
ÄÞëùóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

1 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2004
ÄÞëùóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

20 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2004
Áíåýèõíåò Åîáããåëßåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

2 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2004
Ãéá ìéá ÐïéïôéêÞ ÁíÜðôõîç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

14 Áõãïýóôïõ 2004
Íá áíáäåßîïõìå íÝá áíôáãùíéóôéêÜ ðëåïíåêôÞìáôá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

29 Éïõíßïõ 2004
ÐÁÓÏK: ÅðéóôñïöÞ óôçí ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

30 Ìáúïõ 2004
Ç Óýíïäïò KïñõöÞò ôïõ ÍÁÔÏ êáé ç Ðáãêüóìéá Áñ÷éôåêôïíéêÞ ÁóöÜëåéáò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

21 Ìáúïõ 2004
Ïé ÅõñùåêëïãÝò êáé ï Ñüëïò ôçò ÁñéóôåñÜò

10 Ìáúïõ 2004
Ç ÁëÞèåéá ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

1 Ìáúïõ 2004
Ï åêóõã÷ñïíéóìüò ôùí Åíüðëùí ÄõíÜìåùí êáé ç õëïðïßçóç ôùí åîïðëéóôéêþí ðñïãñáììÜôùí

21 Áðñéëßïõ 2004
ÌåôÜ ôï ÄçìïøÞöéóìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

8 Áðñéëßïõ 2004
Íáé Þ ¼÷é óôï Ó÷Ýäéï ÁíÜí êáé ãéáôß

8 Éïõíßïõ 2014,
The Periphery¢s Purgatory

ATHENS – German Chancellor Angela Merkel¢s upcoming visit to Athens will be a far less tense affair than her earlier journeys here during Europe¢s long financial crisis. Of course, Greeks have little love for Merkel; but, thanks to Europe¢s modest economic recovery, some of the poison has been drawn from Germany¢s relations with Europe¢s most damaged and distressed economies.
Indeed, Europe is no longer considered a risk to global financial stability. The eurozone¢s core economies are showing signs of revival, and financial conditions in the over-indebted periphery are improving as well. But, given capital shortages, depressed demand, and the slow pace of reform in the eurozone periphery, continued progress is far from certain.
In the eurozone economies that were hit hardest by the global economic crisis, the output and employment losses have been huge and persistent. Real (inflation-adjusted) per capita income in the eurozone as a whole hovers around its 2007 level; in Greece and Italy, however, it has sunk to the levels recorded in 2000 and 1997, respectively.

Meanwhile, the eurozone¢s overall unemployment rate is 12%, and it is much higher in the periphery. In Spain, more than 25% of the labor force is jobless, while Italy¢s youth unemployment rate stands at 42%. In Greece, where the overall unemployment rate has climbed to 28%, some 60% of the country¢s young people are unemployed. Recovering from such crippling employment losses will not be easy, and will require a speedy return to high and sustainable growth rates.
Consider Greece, where the government is planning a return to the capital markets in the coming months to finance the country¢s long-term borrowing needs, even though securing such financing would require paying unsustainably high interest rates. The fact that the government seems willing to do so translates clearly its desire to move beyond the influence of the “troika” (the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank).
Indeed, since 2008, Greece¢s GDP has shrunk by almost 25%. Recovering lost capacity will require large amounts of capital, but there are five reasons why such financing is unlikely, under present conditions, to be forthcoming:
• As a result of austerity, public investment as a share of GDP continues to fall and has now reached a record low. Having already committed substantial rescue funds, eurozone authorities do not seem inclined to inject fresh capital.
• Sources of domestic private capital are limited, because the recession and the related near-collapse of asset prices, along with a sharp increase in taxation – particularly on high incomes and on capital – significantly weakened balance sheets.
• Bank lending has slowed drastically, as a result of Greek banks effectively defaulting in the wake of the troika-imposed losses on sovereign creditors and the nationalization of the country¢s banks. A record-low level of deposits and the recession-related rise of non-performing loans have weakened Greek banks¢ capital position further. (Today, companies in the eurozone periphery borrow at substantially higher rates than their counterparts in the core. For bank loans, the ratio is almost two to one; for long-term financing, it may reach as high as ten to one.)
• Greece¢s unsustainable debt position is discouraging foreign private investment. The assumptions about primary surpluses, private-sector involvement, and GDP growth underlying the government¢s commitment to reduce its debt level, which currently exceeds 170% of GDP, to 124% of GDP by 2020 cannot be realized, given Germany¢s opposition to restructuring the official financing that replaced the defaulted private loans. Some easing of loan conditionality – via extended maturities and reduced interest rates ‒ will be agreed later this year, but it will not be enough to calm fears of a new default.
• Trust between foreign and Greek investors is lacking, and it will not be restored until debt sustainability is achieved. But Germany and the other core eurozone countries consistently block any proposal that contemplates debt mutualization or fiscal union. Ideas such as Eurobonds, a single European finance ministry, and increased capitalization of Europe¢s common rescue funds (the European Stability Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism) are not even being contemplated.
Along with inadequate capital supply, Greece is suffering from a demand shortfall, as the troika continues to squeeze the country with harsh austerity. If these policies are not relaxed or offset by more expansionary policies in the eurozone core, demand will remain depressed, discouraging further investment.
Finally, on the reform front, time is running out. For the last few years, rather than confronting the special interests – state-protected businesses, public-sector trade unions, and lobbies – that inhibit reform, Greece has spread its economic misery horizontally through blanket spending cuts. Reforms such as privatizing state-owned enterprises, opening up closed professions, abolishing restrictive business practices, and reducing the size of the public sector have been undertaken very slowly and inefficiently, and they will not significantly alter growth prospects.
As it stands, Greece is unlikely to meet the recovery challenge – and other peripheral economies will probably falter, too. Sufficient reforms and capital are lacking, while the social rifts resulting from austerity increase the risk of potentially devastating political instability. With the European Parliament election approaching, the prospect of populist anti-austerity parties prevailing in the periphery – and of anti-euro, anti-bailout parties gaining power in the core – heightens the risk of instability even more.
Should financial turbulence return and herald a new eurozone crisis, the monetary union¢s sustainability will again be called into question. To prevent this outcome, Greece and the eurozone¢s other peripheral economies must limit austerity, buttress demand, undertake reform, increase investment support, and pursue fiscal union. Unfortunately, these keys to ensuring a cohesive and prosperous eurozone are likely to be left unturned – until, perhaps, the next crisis occurs.

Published on: Project Syndicate (April 2014)

  Âéïãñáöéêü Óçìåßùìá / CV