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: 2015
19 2015The Greek Time BombÉóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»
19 2015H ÅëëçíéêÞ ÙñïëïãéáêÞ ÂüìâáÉóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»
11 2015ÅêëïãÝò: Êßíäõíïé êáé åðéëïãÝòÅöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
: 2014
8 2014The Periphery¢s Purgatory
3 2014ON THE STATE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
: 2013
6 2013The Re-Division of EuropeÉóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»
21 2013The Eurozone¢s Misplaced Orthodoxies
12 2013Bismarck versus Bismarck
29 2013The German Question Revisited
25 2013I Brought the Euro to Greece
4 2013Europe¢s Perpetual Crisis
6 2013A Global “New Deal”?
15 2013Greece and the Euro
21 2013Globalization¢s European Test
: 2012
1 2012Greece¢s Catharsis?
9 2012Steering Clear of the Euro Precipice
3 2012Ç ÅëëÜäá óôç ÌÜ÷ç ôçò ÅõñþðçòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
: 2011
16 2011Ôåëåõôáßá Åõêáéñßá;Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
9 2011ÁíÜêôçóç ôçò ÷áìÝíçò åìðéóôïóýíçò ãéá íá ìåßíïõìå óôï åõñþÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
4 2011Ãéá íá Ìåßíïõìå óôï ÅõñþÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
22 2011Decision time for the eurozone - Project Syndicate
24 2011Ç EëëÜäá óå êñßóç: õðÜñ÷åé äéÝîïäïò;Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»
19 2011Ç EëëÜäá óå Êñßóç: ÕðÜñ÷åé ÄéÝîïäïò;Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»
3 2011AÃÉÏÃÑÁÖÉÅÓ ÓêÜëåòÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
10 2011Policy prescriptions for curing -eurozonitis-
7 2011×ÑÇÌÁÔÉÓÔÇÑÉO 1999-2000
17 2011Ç Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç óå ÊñßóçÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
: 2010
26 2010Ïé äéáñèñùôéêÝò áëëáãÝò èá ôïíþóïõí ôçí ïéêïíïìßáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
20 2010ÊËÅÉÄÉ ÃÉÁ ÅÎÏÄÏ ÁÐÏ ÔÇÍ ÊÑÉÓÇ ÏÉ ÌÅÔÁÑÑÕÈÌÉÓÅÉÓÅöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
26 2010Êñßóç êáé ÁíÜêáìøçÐåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»
4 2010ÁÑÈÑÏ ÓÔÇÍ ÇËÅÊÔÑÏÍÉÊÇ ÅÖÇÌÅÑÉÄÁ NEWSIT
3 2010ÄÞëùóç óôçí åöçìåñßäá Ôï ÂçìáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»
18 2010Êñßóéìåò ¿ñåòÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
18 2010Ïéêïíïìßá:Êñßóéìåò ÅðéëïãÝòÐåñéïäéêü «ÅÐÉÊÁÉÑÁ»
10 2010ÅëëçíéêÞ Ïéêïíïìßá:¸îïäïò áðü ôçí êñßóçÐåñéïäéêü «FORUM»
9 2010ÙÑÁ ÁÍÁÄÉÐËÙÓÇÓ ÓÔÇÍ ÏÉÊÏÍÏÌÉÊÇ ÐÏËÉÔÉÊÇÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
: 2009
12 2009Ìåßùóç ôïõ åëëåßììáôïò ôï 2010 óôï 8% ôïõ ÁÅÐÅöçìåñßäá «Ï Êüóìïò ôïõ ÅðåíäõôÞ»
9 2009ÅëëÜäá êáé Êñßóç: ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Ïðéóèïäñüìçóç;Åöçìåñßäá «Áîßá»
1 2009Ïéêïíïìßá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝòÐåñéïäéêü «Äçìüóéïò ÔïìÝáò»
26 2009ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Óôáóéìüôçôá;Ðåñéïäéêü «The Economist»
15 2009Êéíäõíïé êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ôçí ÏéêïíïìßáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
1 2009ÌåôÜ ôéò ÂñõîÝëëåòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
26 2009ÓôñáâÜ ÁñìåíßæïõìåÅöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
4 2009«ÅëëÜäá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÞ»Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
21 2009¿ñá ÁðïöÜóåùíÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
29 2009Ðáãêüóìéá Êñßóç êáé ÅëëÜäáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
7 2009«ÍÝá ÔÜîç» êáé ÅëëÜäáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
15 2009¸ëëåéììá Óõíáßíåóçò, Þ Çãåóßáò ;Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
15 2009Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åêóõã÷ñïíéóìüÅöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
15 2009Êéíäõíåýåé ôï Åõñþ;Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
14 2009Êñßóç êáé êçäåìïíßáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
24 2009ÔÝóóåñá ðñïáðáéôïýìåíá ãéá åðéóôñïöÞ óôçí áíÜðôõîçÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
18 2009Ôï êáëü ôïõ ôüðïõÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
: 2008
17 2008ÊïéíùíéêÞ ÅîÝãåñóç êáé Ïéêïíïìéêïß ÊßíäõíïéÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
22 2008Ãéá ôçí ¸îïäï áðü ôçí ÊñßóçÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
20 2008Óþñåõóç ÊéíäýíùíÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
5 2008ÏìðÜìáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
29 2008Ç ¿ñá ôçò ÊåíôñïáñéóôåñÜòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
16 2008ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôçí ÊñßóçÅöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»
10 2008ÊñÜôïò êáé ÏéêïíïìßáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
6 2008Êñßóç êáé ÅêëïãÝòÅöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»
24 2008ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí ÊñßóçÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
17 2008Ïéêïíïìßá êáé ÁîéïðéóôßáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
10 2008Ðñüêëçóç ÍßêçòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
3 2008Êñßóç ÐïëéôéêÞòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
27 2008ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò ãéá ôçí ÏéêïíïìßáÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
26 20083ç ÓåðôÝìâñçÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
29 2008ÌåôáññõèìßóåéòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
22 2008ÄéÝîïäïò óôçí ÊñßóçÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
16 2008Ç Åõñþðç óå Õðï÷þñçóçÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
9 2008ÏõÜóéãêôïí, Éïýëéïò 08Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
1 2008ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ÐïëéôéêÞÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
24 2008ÐïëéôéêÞ ÁëëáãÞÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
18 2008H ÐïëéôéêÞ óå ÄïêéìáóßáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
11 2008Ðñüåäñïò ÏìðÜìá;Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
21 2008×ùñßò ÁöïñéóìïýòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
5 2008Áêñßâåéá êáé ÅõñþÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
15 2008ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç , Åõñþ êáé ï ñüëïò ôïõ ÊñÜôïõòÅöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
27 2008ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ç ÅëëÜäáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
: 2007
10 2007Ôï ÄéáêýâåõìáÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
4 2007ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé ÌåôáññõèìßóåéòÅöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
20 2007Ãéá Ìéá ÐñáãìáôéêÞ Ìåôáññýèìéóç - ÊñÜôïò êáé ÐïëßôçòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
15 2007Óôçí Ðñþôç ÃñáììÞ ôçò ÁíÜðôõîçòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
11 2007ÐåñéâÜëëïí êáé ÐïëéôéêÞÅöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
9 2007Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
7 2007Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç, ïéêïíïìßá ôçò áãïñÜò êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞÐåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»
6 2007ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé ÅêëïãÝòÐåñéïäéêü «ÁÍÔÉ»
18 2007Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá ôùí Åêëïãþí
25 2007ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôç ÃáëëßáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
3 2007Ôï ÔÝëïò ôçò ÁìåñéêáíéêÞò Ìïíïêñáôïñßáò;Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
28 2007ÁñéóôåñÜ êáé ÌåôáññõèìßóåéòÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
1 2007Ãéá ¸íá ÍÝï Êýêëï ÌåôáññõèìßóåùíÐåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»
: 2006
29 2006ÁëëáãÞ óôçí ÐáéäåßáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
24 2006ÌåôÜ ôéò åêëïãÝò, ôé;Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
18 2006Ïéêïíïìßá : Ç ÍÝá ÐñüêëçóçÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
4 2006Êáôåõèýíóåéò ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç ôçò ÅëëçíéêÞò ÏéêïíïìßáòÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
10 2006Ó÷üëéï Ñé÷Üñäïõ Óùìåñßôç óôç Íôüúôóå ÂÝëëå: Ç ðåñßðôùóç Ðáðáíôùíßïõ
5 2006Ãéá ìéá ÓôñáôçãéêÞ ôçò ÁñéóôåñÜò óôçí ÅõñþðçÅöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
3 2006Ðüñïé ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç êáé ôçí ÊïéíùíéêÞ Óõíï÷ÞÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
15 2006ãéá ôïí ÁíäñÝá ÐáðáíäñÝïõ
25 2006To: Ôhe Editor of the Financial Times
16 2006Ï êüóìïò ôñÝ÷åé. Ç ÅëëÜäá ;Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
10 2006Ôï åðüìåíï âÞìáÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
9 2006Ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ áíáêÜìðôåé êáé óôçí ðñüèåóç øÞöïõ Ý÷åé ìçäåíßóåé ôç äéáöïñÜ ìå ôç ÍÄ ...Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
17 2006Ç ÁëÞèåéá ãéá ôçí ÏéêïíïìßáÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
: 2005
20 2005ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Áðáó÷üëçóçÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
17 2005Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åõñùðáúêü ÎåêßíçìáÅöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
1 2005Ðïõ ÐÜåé ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ;Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò»
1 2005Ïéêïíïìßá, ÁíÜðôõîç êáé ÌåôáññõèìßóåéòÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
16 2005Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùíÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
9 2005ÄéáñèñùôéêÝò ÁëëáãÝò : Í.Ä. êáé ÐÁÓÏÊ
1 2005Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùíÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»
22 2005Êé üìùò ÷ñåéáæüìáóôå Ýíá íÝï êýìá åêóõã÷ñïíéóìïýÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
22 2005Ç ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç êáé ï Ñüëïò ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ¸íùóçò óôçí Ðáãêüóìéá ÄéáêõâÝñíçóç
17 2005Ìåôáîý Åõñþðçò êáé ÁìåñéêÞò: Ç ÄåîéÜ ÅðéëïãÞÅöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»
2 2005Ç ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅêôñïðÞ ôçò Í.Ä.Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
26 2005EõñùðáúêÞ Åíïðïßçóç êáé ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêçÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
13 2005Ïéêïíïìßá : ¸íáò ÷ñüíïò ÍÝáò Äçìïêñáôßáò
24 2005ÐñïÝ÷åé ôï èÝìá ôçò ïéêïíïìßáò ...Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»
25 2005ÐÁÓÏÊ: Ïé ðñïêëÞóåéò ôçò ÍÝáò Åðï÷ÞòÅöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»
12 2005ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí åñþôçóç ôçò ÇÌÅÑÇÓÉÁÓ
1 2005Ïéêïíïìßá : ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéòÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
: 2004
19 2004ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé ÓõíáóðéóìüòÅöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò»
10 2004ÅîùôåñéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ ÷ùñßò ÐõîßäáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
9 2004Óêüðéá êáé ÅëëçíéêÞ ÐïëéôéêÞ óôá ÂáëêÜíéáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»
5 2004ÄÞëùóçÅöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»
1 2004ÄÞëùóçÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
20 2004Áíåýèõíåò ÅîáããåëßåòÅöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»
2 2004Ãéá ìéá ÐïéïôéêÞ ÁíÜðôõîçÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
14 2004Íá áíáäåßîïõìå íÝá áíôáãùíéóôéêÜ ðëåïíåêôÞìáôáÅöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»
29 2004ÐÁÓÏK: ÅðéóôñïöÞ óôçí ÐïëéôéêÞÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
30 2004Ç Óýíïäïò KïñõöÞò ôïõ ÍÁÔÏ êáé ç Ðáãêüóìéá Áñ÷éôåêôïíéêÞ ÁóöÜëåéáòÅöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»
21 2004Ïé ÅõñùåêëïãÝò êáé ï Ñüëïò ôçò ÁñéóôåñÜò
10 2004Ç ÁëÞèåéá ãéá ôçí ÏéêïíïìßáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
1 2004Ï åêóõã÷ñïíéóìüò ôùí Åíüðëùí ÄõíÜìåùí êáé ç õëïðïßçóç ôùí åîïðëéóôéêþí ðñïãñáììÜôùí
21 2004ÌåôÜ ôï ÄçìïøÞöéóìáÅöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»
8 2004Íáé Þ ¼÷é óôï Ó÷Ýäéï ÁíÜí êáé ãéáôß
6 2013, Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate» The Re-Division of Europe
ATHENS – As the eurozone debt crisis has steadily widened the divide between Europe¢s stronger northern economies and the weaker, more debt-laden economies in the south (with France a kind of no man¢s land economy in between), one question is on everyone¢s mind: Can Europe¢s monetary union – indeed, the European Union itself – survive? While the eurozone¢s northern members enjoy low borrowing costs and stable growth, its southern members face high borrowing costs, recession, and deep cuts in incomes and social spending. They have also suffered substantial output losses, and have far higher unemployment rates than their northern counterparts. Unemployment in the eurozone as a whole averages about 12%, compared to more than 25% in Spain and Greece (where youth unemployment now stands at 60%). Indeed, while aggregate per capita income in the eurozone remains at 2007 levels, Greece has been pushed back to 2000 levels, and Italy today finds itself somewhere in 1997. Europe¢s southern economies owe their deteriorating circumstances largely to excessive austerity and the absence of measures to compensate for demand losses. Currency devaluation – which would boost the competitiveness of domestic industry by lowering export prices – obviously is not an option in a monetary union. But Europe¢s stronger economies have resisted pressure to undertake more expansionary fiscal policies, which would lift demand for its weaker economies¢ exports. The European Central Bank did not follow the lead of other advanced-country central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve, in pursuing a more aggressive monetary policy to cut borrowing costs. And no financing has been offered for public-investment projects in the southern countries. Moreover, fiscal and financial measures aimed at strengthening eurozone governance have been inadequate to restore confidence in the euro. And Europe¢s troubled economies have been slow to undertake structural reforms; improvements in competitiveness reflect wage and salary cuts, rather than productivity gains. While these policies – or lack thereof – have impeded recovery in the southern countries, they have yielded reasonable growth and very low unemployment rates for the northern economies. In fact, by maintaining large trade surpluses, Germany is exporting unemployment and recession to its weaker neighbors. As Europe¢s north-south divide widens, so will interest-rate differentials; as a result, conducting a single monetary policy will become increasingly difficult. In the recession-afflicted south, continued fiscal consolidation will demand new austerity measures – a prospect that citizens will reject. Such impasses will lead to social tension and political crisis, or to new requests for financial assistance, which the northern countries are certain to resist. Either way, financial and political instability could lead to the common currency¢s collapse. As long as the eurozone establishes a kind of wary equilibrium, with the weaker economies stabilizing at low growth rates, current policies are unlikely to change. Incremental intergovernmental solutions will continue to prevail, and Europe¢s economy will soldier on, steadily losing ground to the US and emerging economies like China and India. For now, Germany is satisfied with the status quo, enjoying stable growth and retaining control over domestic economic policy, while the ECB¢s limited powers and strict mandate to maintain price stability ease fears of inflation. But how will Germany react when the north-south divide becomes large enough to threaten the euro¢s survival? The answer depends on how Germans perceive their long-term interests, and on the choices of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Her recent election to a third term offers room for bolder policy choices, while forcing her to focus more on her legacy – specifically, whether she wishes to be associated with the euro¢s collapse or with its revival. Two outcomes now seem possible. One scenario is that the economic and political crisis in the southern countries spreads, inciting fears in Germany that the country faces a long-term threat. This could drive Germany to withdraw from the eurozone and form a smaller currency union with other northern countries. The second possibility is that the crisis remains relatively contained, leading Germany to pursue closer economic and fiscal union. This would entail the mutualization of some national debt and the transfer of economic-policy sovereignty to supranational European institutions. Of course, such a move would carry considerable political costs in Germany, where many taxpayers recoil at the notion of assuming the debts of the fiscally profligate southern countries, without considering how much Germany would benefit from a stable and dynamic monetary union. But a new grand coalition between Merkel and the Social Democrats could be sufficient to make this shift possible. Even so, there could be victims. Indeed, the continued failure of smaller countries like Greece and Cyprus to fulfill their commitments reinforces the impression that they will forever be dependent on financial assistance. The exit of one or two of these “undisciplined” countries could be a requirement for the German public to agree to such a policy shift. Europe¢s north-south divide has become a time bomb lying at the foundations of the currency union. Defusing it will require less austerity, more demand stimulus, greater investment support, deeper reforms, and meaningful progress toward economic and political union. One hopes that modest recovery in the south, aided by strong German leadership in the north, will steer Europe in the right direction. © 1995-2013 Project Syndicate
