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Ðñüóöáôåò Êáôá÷ùñÞóåéò |Áñ÷åßï

Áñ÷åßï: 2015

19 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
The Greek Time Bomb
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

19 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
H ÅëëçíéêÞ ÙñïëïãéáêÞ Âüìâá
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

11 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2015
ÅêëïãÝò: Êßíäõíïé êáé åðéëïãÝò
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2014

8 Éïõíßïõ 2014
The Periphery¢s Purgatory

3 Éïõíßïõ 2014
ON THE STATE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

Áñ÷åßï: 2013

6 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2013
The Re-Division of Europe
Éóôïóåëßäá «Project-Syndicate»

21 Áõãïýóôïõ 2013
The Eurozone¢s Misplaced Orthodoxies

12 Éïõíßïõ 2013
Bismarck versus Bismarck

29 Ìáúïõ 2013
The German Question Revisited

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2013
I Brought the Euro to Greece

4 Áðñéëßïõ 2013
Europe¢s Perpetual Crisis

6 Ìáñôßïõ 2013
A Global “New Deal”?

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2013
Greece and the Euro

21 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2013
Globalization¢s European Test

Áñ÷åßï: 2012

1 Éïõíßïõ 2012
Greece¢s Catharsis?

9 Ìáúïõ 2012
Steering Clear of the Euro Precipice

3 Ìáúïõ 2012
Ç ÅëëÜäá óôç ÌÜ÷ç ôçò Åõñþðçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2011

16 Íïåìâñßïõ 2011
Ôåëåõôáßá Åõêáéñßá;
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

9 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2011
ÁíÜêôçóç ôçò ÷áìÝíçò åìðéóôïóýíçò ãéá íá ìåßíïõìå óôï åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2011
Ãéá íá Ìåßíïõìå óôï Åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2011
Decision time for the eurozone - Project Syndicate

24 Áðñéëßïõ 2011
Ç EëëÜäá óå êñßóç: õðÜñ÷åé äéÝîïäïò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

19 Áðñéëßïõ 2011
Ç EëëÜäá óå Êñßóç: ÕðÜñ÷åé ÄéÝîïäïò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

3 Ìáñôßïõ 2011
AÃÉÏÃÑÁÖÉÅÓ ÓêÜëåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

10 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2011
Policy prescriptions for curing -eurozonitis-

7 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2011
×ÑÇÌÁÔÉÓÔÇÑÉO 1999-2000

17 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2011
Ç Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç óå Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2010

26 Éïõíßïõ 2010
Ïé äéáñèñùôéêÝò áëëáãÝò èá ôïíþóïõí ôçí ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

20 Éïõíßïõ 2010
ÊËÅÉÄÉ ÃÉÁ ÅÎÏÄÏ ÁÐÏ ÔÇÍ ÊÑÉÓÇ ÏÉ ÌÅÔÁÑÑÕÈÌÉÓÅÉÓ
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

26 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
Êñßóç êáé ÁíÜêáìøç
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

4 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
ÁÑÈÑÏ ÓÔÇÍ ÇËÅÊÔÑÏÍÉÊÇ ÅÖÇÌÅÑÉÄÁ NEWSIT

3 Ìáñôßïõ 2010
ÄÞëùóç óôçí åöçìåñßäá Ôï Âçìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

18 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
Êñßóéìåò ¿ñåò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

18 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
Ïéêïíïìßá:Êñßóéìåò ÅðéëïãÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «ÅÐÉÊÁÉÑÁ»

10 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2010
ÅëëçíéêÞ Ïéêïíïìßá:¸îïäïò áðü ôçí êñßóç
Ðåñéïäéêü «FORUM»

9 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2010
ÙÑÁ ÁÍÁÄÉÐËÙÓÇÓ ÓÔÇÍ ÏÉÊÏÍÏÌÉÊÇ ÐÏËÉÔÉÊÇ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

Áñ÷åßï: 2009

12 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
Ìåßùóç ôïõ åëëåßììáôïò ôï 2010 óôï 8% ôïõ ÁÅÐ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ï Êüóìïò ôïõ ÅðåíäõôÞ»

9 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
ÅëëÜäá êáé Êñßóç: ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Ïðéóèïäñüìçóç;
Åöçìåñßäá «Áîßá»

1 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2009
Ïéêïíïìßá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «Äçìüóéïò ÔïìÝáò»

26 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
ÁíÜêáìøç Þ Óôáóéìüôçôá;
Ðåñéïäéêü «The Economist»

15 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
Êéíäõíïé êáé ÐñïïðôéêÝò ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Íïåìâñßïõ 2009
ÌåôÜ ôéò ÂñõîÝëëåò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

26 Éïõëßïõ 2009
ÓôñáâÜ Áñìåíßæïõìå
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Éïõëßïõ 2009
«ÅëëÜäá: Êñßóç êáé ÐñïïðôéêÞ»
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

21 Éïõíßïõ 2009
¿ñá ÁðïöÜóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Áðñéëßïõ 2009
Ðáãêüóìéá Êñßóç êáé ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

7 Áðñéëßïõ 2009
«ÍÝá ÔÜîç» êáé ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Ìáñôßïõ 2009
¸ëëåéììá Óõíáßíåóçò, Þ Çãåóßáò ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åêóõã÷ñïíéóìü
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

15 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Êéíäõíåýåé ôï Åõñþ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

14 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2009
Êñßóç êáé êçäåìïíßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

24 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2009
ÔÝóóåñá ðñïáðáéôïýìåíá ãéá åðéóôñïöÞ óôçí áíÜðôõîç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

18 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2009
Ôï êáëü ôïõ ôüðïõ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2008

17 Äåêåìâñßïõ 2008
ÊïéíùíéêÞ ÅîÝãåñóç êáé Ïéêïíïìéêïß Êßíäõíïé
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
Ãéá ôçí ¸îïäï áðü ôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

20 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
Óþñåõóç Êéíäýíùí
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

5 Íïåìâñßïõ 2008
ÏìðÜìá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
Ç ¿ñá ôçò ÊåíôñïáñéóôåñÜò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

16 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

10 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
ÊñÜôïò êáé Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

6 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2008
Êñßóç êáé ÅêëïãÝò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

24 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

17 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Ïéêïíïìßá êáé Áîéïðéóôßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

10 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Ðñüêëçóç Íßêçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

3 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2008
Êñßóç ÐïëéôéêÞò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

27 Áõãïýóôïõ 2008
ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

26 Áõãïýóôïõ 2008
3ç ÓåðôÝìâñç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

29 Éïõëßïõ 2008
Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÄéÝîïäïò óôçí Êñßóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

16 Éïõëßïõ 2008
Ç Åõñþðç óå Õðï÷þñçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

9 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÏõÜóéãêôïí, Éïýëéïò 08
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Éïõëßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

24 Éïõíßïõ 2008
ÐïëéôéêÞ ÁëëáãÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

18 Éïõíßïõ 2008
H ÐïëéôéêÞ óå Äïêéìáóßá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

11 Éïõíßïõ 2008
Ðñüåäñïò ÏìðÜìá;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

21 Ìáúïõ 2008
×ùñßò Áöïñéóìïýò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

5 Ìáúïõ 2008
Áêñßâåéá êáé Åõñþ
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

15 Áðñéëßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç , Åõñþ êáé ï ñüëïò ôïõ ÊñÜôïõò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

27 Ìáñôßïõ 2008
ÄéåèíÞò Êñßóç êáé ç ÅëëÜäá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

Áñ÷åßï: 2007

10 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2007
Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

4 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2007
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

20 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ãéá Ìéá ÐñáãìáôéêÞ Ìåôáññýèìéóç - ÊñÜôïò êáé Ðïëßôçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

15 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Óôçí Ðñþôç ÃñáììÞ ôçò ÁíÜðôõîçò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

11 Éïõíßïõ 2007
ÐåñéâÜëëïí êáé ÐïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

9 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

7 Éïõíßïõ 2007
Ðáãêïóìéïðïßçóç, ïéêïíïìßá ôçò áãïñÜò êáé ðñïïäåõôéêÞ ðïëéôéêÞ
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

6 Éïõíßïõ 2007
ÐÁÓÏÊ êáé ÅêëïãÝò
Ðåñéïäéêü «ÁÍÔÉ»

18 Ìáúïõ 2007
Ôï Äéáêýâåõìá ôùí Åêëïãþí

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2007
ÌáèÞìáôá áðü ôç Ãáëëßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

3 Áðñéëßïõ 2007
Ôï ÔÝëïò ôçò ÁìåñéêáíéêÞò Ìïíïêñáôïñßáò;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

28 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2007
ÁñéóôåñÜ êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

1 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2007
Ãéá ¸íá ÍÝï Êýêëï Ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Ðåñéïäéêü «Ìåôáññýèìéóç»

Áñ÷åßï: 2006

29 Íïåìâñßïõ 2006
ÁëëáãÞ óôçí Ðáéäåßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

24 Ïêôùâñßïõ 2006
ÌåôÜ ôéò åêëïãÝò, ôé;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

18 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2006
Ïéêïíïìßá : Ç ÍÝá Ðñüêëçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

4 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2006
Êáôåõèýíóåéò ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç ôçò ÅëëçíéêÞò Ïéêïíïìßáò
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

10 Áõãïýóôïõ 2006
Ó÷üëéï Ñé÷Üñäïõ Óùìåñßôç óôç Íôüúôóå ÂÝëëå: Ç ðåñßðôùóç Ðáðáíôùíßïõ

5 Éïõëßïõ 2006
Ãéá ìéá ÓôñáôçãéêÞ ôçò ÁñéóôåñÜò óôçí Åõñþðç
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

3 Éïõëßïõ 2006
Ðüñïé ãéá ôçí ÁíÜðôõîç êáé ôçí ÊïéíùíéêÞ Óõíï÷Þ
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

15 Ìáúïõ 2006
ãéá ôïí ÁíäñÝá ÐáðáíäñÝïõ

25 Áðñéëßïõ 2006
To: Ôhe Editor of the Financial Times

16 Áðñéëßïõ 2006
Ï êüóìïò ôñÝ÷åé. Ç ÅëëÜäá ;
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊõñéáêÜôéêç Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

10 Ìáñôßïõ 2006
Ôï åðüìåíï âÞìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

9 Ìáñôßïõ 2006
Ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ áíáêÜìðôåé êáé óôçí ðñüèåóç øÞöïõ Ý÷åé ìçäåíßóåé ôç äéáöïñÜ ìå ôç ÍÄ ...
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

17 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2006
Ç ÁëÞèåéá ãéá ôçí Ïéêïíïìßá
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

Áñ÷åßï: 2005

20 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Áðáó÷üëçóç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

17 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ãéá Ýíá ÍÝï Åõñùðáúêü Îåêßíçìá
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

1 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ðïõ ÐÜåé ôï ÐÁÓÏÊ;
Åöçìåñßäá «¸èíïò»

1 Óåðôåìâñßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá, ÁíÜðôõîç êáé Ìåôáññõèìßóåéò
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

16 Éïõíßïõ 2005
Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôá ÍÝá»

9 Éïõíßïõ 2005
ÄéáñèñùôéêÝò ÁëëáãÝò : Í.Ä. êáé ÐÁÓÏÊ

1 Éïõíßïõ 2005
Ïé ðïëéôéêÝò ðñïûðïèÝóåéò ôùí ìåôáññõèìßóåùí
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá ôïõ ÓáââÜôïõ»

22 Ìáúïõ 2005
Êé üìùò ÷ñåéáæüìáóôå Ýíá íÝï êýìá åêóõã÷ñïíéóìïý
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

22 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ç ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç êáé ï Ñüëïò ôçò ÅõñùðáúêÞò ¸íùóçò óôçí Ðáãêüóìéá ÄéáêõâÝñíçóç

17 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ìåôáîý Åõñþðçò êáé ÁìåñéêÞò: Ç ÄåîéÜ ÅðéëïãÞ
Åöçìåñßäá «ÂÞìá ôçò ÊõñéáêÞò»

2 Áðñéëßïõ 2005
Ç ÅõñùðáúêÞ ÅêôñïðÞ ôçò Í.Ä.
Åöçìåñßäá «Åëåõèåñïôõðßá»

26 Ìáñôßïõ 2005
EõñùðáúêÞ Åíïðïßçóç êáé ÓõíôáãìáôéêÞ ÓõíèÞêç
Åöçìåñßäá «Çìåñçóßá»

13 Ìáñôßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá : ¸íáò ÷ñüíïò ÍÝáò Äçìïêñáôßáò

24 Öåâñïõáñßïõ 2005
ÐñïÝ÷åé ôï èÝìá ôçò ïéêïíïìßáò ...
Åöçìåñßäá «ÊáèçìåñéíÞ»

25 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
ÐÁÓÏÊ: Ïé ðñïêëÞóåéò ôçò ÍÝáò Åðï÷Þò
Åöçìåñßäá «Ôï ÂÞìá»

12 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
ÁðÜíôçóç óôçí åñþôçóç ôçò ÇÌÅÑÇÓÉÁÓ

1 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2005
Ïéêïíïìßá : ÍÝåò ÐñïêëÞóåéò
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Íáé Þ ¼÷é óôï Ó÷Ýäéï ÁíÜí êáé ãéáôß

21 Éáíïõáñßïõ 2013,
Globalization¢s European Test

ATHENS – The eurozone¢s sovereign-debt crisis represents a significant challenge for Europe and the global economy. But it is also an opportunity: overcoming the challenge will not only contribute to a sustained global economic recovery, but will also test our capabilities to control the dangers of globalization.

The integration of markets in recent decades, coupled with enormous technological progress in communications and transport, has diffused growth to regions that for centuries lagged behind the dramatic rise in living standards witnessed in Europe, North America, and Japan since the Industrial Revolution. More efficient use of global resources allowed productivity to grow, lifting billions of people out of poverty and into the modern world.

The downside is that national control over economic policy has been significantly diminished, while international economic governance confronts new problems. As markets integrate and systems converge, addressing imbalances in either the real economy or the financial sector becomes increasingly difficult, owing to the constraints on multilateral policy cooperation built into institutional arrangements designed for nationally-bounded economies.

Over the last decade, large external imbalances were allowed to emerge within the eurozone. The competitive position of peripheral member countries – particularly Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Italy – deteriorated sharply vis-à-vis the core countries. Governments in the periphery turned a blind eye to credit-fueled bubbles and public or private debt, and failed to adopt counter-cyclical fiscal measures or promote structural reforms to improve competitiveness. Large external deficits were matched by surpluses in core countries, whose excess savings then flowed back to the periphery, in turn permitting excessive borrowing and leading to fiscal blowouts.

Greece was the first country to seek financial assistance from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, with a bailout program negotiated in May 2010. Exceptionally harsh austerity measures included sharp tax increases and cuts in public-sector salaries and pensions. Structural reforms – particularly privatization, market liberalization, opening up closed professions, and downsizing the government sector – were either neglected or poorly monitored. The result was a deep and prolonged recession, limited gains in competitiveness, and missed fiscal-deficit targets.
Poor design and implementation of the adjustment programs undoubtedly has contributed significantly to the persistence of crisis conditions. However, debt growth exposed a critical flaw in the eurozone¢s economic constitution: national debts are member countries¢ responsibility, but the common currency lacks a sovereign. Unlike most monetary authorities, the European Central Bank cannot act as a lender of last resort, which, together with the absence of common bonds (Eurobonds), induced large-scale speculation on member states¢ national debt, reflected in widening interest-rate spreads.

Resolving the crisis inevitably includes action on two fronts. The over-indebted countries must address the causes of the persistent imbalances by implementing structural reforms that liberalize markets and encourage wage flexibility. At the same time, the eurozone must be equipped with the instruments needed to restore stability and prevent crises from recurring.

Given its specific history, Europe cannot emulate the United States¢ model of a functioning economic union. Nonetheless, in order to make the currency union work, Europe should take decisive steps in that direction. This means centralizing European debt through Eurobonds, mobilizing sufficient rescue funds, allowing the ECB to intervene in the primary bond markets, and establishing both a fiscal and a banking union.

However, the unification agenda lacks universal support. The issuance of Eurobonds would imply subsidizing debt-service costs for less creditworthy countries, raising the specter of a “transfer economy” – poorer countries¢ permanent dependence on rich countries¢ assistance – which Germany strongly opposes. Fiscal union would also include common taxation, implying a loss of sovereignty.
Such fears are reinforced by the prospect of extending unification to the political sphere in order to give supranational governing institutions sufficient democratic legitimacy. This could involve popular election of the European Commission president and strengthening the European Parliament¢s powers while diminishing those of the intergovernmental European Council.

Until then, “too little, too late” and “muddling through” will continue to characterize EU and eurozone policymaking. This, coupled with weak reform efforts in the over-indebted countries, goes a long way toward explaining Europe¢s inability to overcome the crisis and set a course for economic recovery and steady growth.

But the eurozone crisis is also a globalization crisis. In an open, globalized economy, the gap between winners and losers widens as competition intensifies. And, as markets integrate and become more interdependent, the need for policy discipline and international cooperation increases.
A key task is to prevent the emergence of excessive current-account imbalances, which means supporting exchange-rate realignments and appropriate adjustments in fiscal policies. A new global financial-services rulebook, including tougher regulation and strengthened supervision, as well as trade liberalization and higher volumes of appropriately targeted development assistance, would also contribute decisively to raising the standards of international economic governance.

The challenge for political leaders is to ensure that the current era of rising and more widely diffused prosperity endures, so that humanity¢s poorest eventually share the benefits of modern civilization. This requires reinforcing international governance institutions, such as the G-20. It also requires that the outcome of Europe¢s struggle to establish effective institutions offers grounds for hope, not despair.

(This article is an adapted version of the Allama Iqbal Memorial Lecture, which Yannos Papantoniou recently delivered in Islamabad.)

  Âéïãñáöéêü Óçìåßùìá / CV